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LEGAL SHORTS
RECENT DECISIONS AFFECTING THE
MONTANA PRACTITIONER
I. STATE V. BARINABY 1
A. Introduction
In 2004, Peter Barnaby was convicted of operating a clandes-
tine methamphetamine laboratory in Lake County.2 Barnaby ap-
pealed the district court's denial of his motion to suppress evi-
dence. He claimed the police lacked probable cause for the search
warrant.3 The Montana Supreme Court upheld the district court,
and arguably significantly changed Montana's warrant applica-
tion procedure.
The warrant application to search Barnaby's home contained
information that related primarily to Barnaby's accomplice, June
Sheridan.4 That information included Sheridan's efforts to obtain
the ingredients to make methamphetamine 5 and her expertise to
manufacture it.6 Sheridan stole ingredients from the local Target
store,7 and purchased other ingredients from a pharmacy and
hardware store.8 The application also described Sheridan's habits
and where she spent her time. 9
Barnaby's only connection to the application was Sheridan's
presence at his home and the odd happenings around his prop-
1. State v. Barnaby, 142 P.3d 809 (Mont. 2006).
2. Id. at 812.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 812-14.
5. Id. at 813.
6. Id. at 812-13.
7. Barnaby, 142 P.3d at 813.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 814.
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erty.10 A concerned citizen saw Sheridan's vehicle back up to Bar-
naby's home, and observed Barnaby and Sheridan unload the con-
tents of the car's trunk intentionally shielded by tarps. 11 The ap-
plication also noted that a fire constantly burned in Barnaby's
yard, and unusually busy traffic occurred at all hours of the day
and night.12
As a catch-all of sorts, the warrant application concluded by
stating that "all of the persons mentioned in the application had
given reliable information in the past" and had been proven relia-
ble "with corroborating information that resulted in arrests from
the information they provided."' 3
Barnaby and Sheridan both moved to suppress the evidence
obtained during the search based on a lack of probable cause to
issue the warrant.' 4 Barnaby's central argument' 5 was that most
of the information contained in the application "pertained solely to
Sheridan, and that such information did not provide probable
cause to search his residence."' 6 To determine the outcome, the
Court reviewed case precedent regarding Montana's search and
seizure warrant requirements.
B. Reesman Test
State v. Reesman17 set forth a three-step test to determine
"whether an informant's information is sufficient to establish
probable cause."' 8 The first question in the test is whether the
informant is anonymous. If so, the informant's information must
be independently corroborated.' 9 If the informant is not anony-
mous, then the second question in the test is whether "the inform-
ant's information [is] based on his or her personal observation of
the described criminal activity."20 If the information is not based
on personal observation, "then again independent corroboration is
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Barnaby, 142 P.3d at 814.
14. Id.
15. Barnaby's appeal also pointed out that the date and address on the warrant appli-
cation were incorrect, errors the Court held were typographic and harmless. Id.
16. Id. at 815.
17. State v. Reesman, 10 P.3d 83 (Mont. 2000).
18. Id. at 89.
19. Id.
20. Id.
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required."21 If the information is based on the informant's per-
sonal observations, then the final question is whether the inform-
ant is a reliable source.22
Reliability breaks down into three categories: information
from a confidential informant; an admission against interest; and
information from a concerned citizen. 23 If a confidential inform-
ant has provided "reliable and accurate information to officers in
the past," no further corroboration is needed. 24 Likewise, if the
information is gleaned from an admission against an informant's
own interest, further corroboration is unnecessary.25 Finally, if a
concerned citizen provides the information, and "the information
provided demonstrates a sufficient degree of the nature of the cir-
cumstances under which the incriminating information became
known," then no further corroboration is needed. 26 If the inform-
ant meets none of these descriptions, he is deemed an unreliable
source, and the police must independently corroborate the infor-
mation.27
Rather than completely overruling Reesman, the Barnaby
majority stated that it was "simply overrul[ing] an unduly restric-
tive rule that never should have been imposed under the long-
established and flexible totality of the circumstances test."28 The
majority stated, "[wle simply determine that the proposition set
forth in Reesman that independent police work represents the
only method of corroboration under the totality of the circum-
stances test is wrong as a matter of law."29
Instead of overruling Reesman outright, the majority worked
around the "unduly restrictive rule."30 To do this, it looked at the
warrant application as a whole and rejected Barnaby's "divide and
conquer" approach of dissecting the application and piecing it back
together.31 The majority explained that Barnaby's proposed rigid
totality of the circumstances test "conflicts with [the Court's] ap-
proach by forcing a judicial officer to apply a strict test to evaluate
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Reesman, 10 P.3d at 89-90.
24. Id. at 89.
25. Id. at 90.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. State v. Barnaby, 142 P.3d 809, 818-19 (Mont. 2006).
29. Id. at 818.
30. Id. at 819.
31. Id. at 817-18.
2007 237
3
et al.: Recent Decisions
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 2007
MONTANA LAW REVIEW
each element in a warrant separately."32 The majority rejected
Barnaby's approach, and stated that, because probable cause
"poses a fluid concept,"33 rigid rules are not "easily reconcil[ed] ...
with the flexibility of the totality of the circumstances test."34
In Barnaby's situation, the application contained "highly
credible" evidence that Barnaby's friend, Sheridan, was involved
in the production of methamphetamine and was present at Bar-
naby's residence. 35 Consequently, although no single report "on
its own, satisf[ied] the Reesman criteria," the other information in
the application "provid[ed] a basis for finding probable cause in
this case."
3 6
C. Justice Cotter's Dissent
Justice Cotter dissented from the majority's affirmation of the
district court's denial of Barnaby's motion to suppress.37 Justice
Cotter's dissent argued that the majority "stretch[ed] the 'flexible'
totality of the circumstances test beyond its intended limit" and
"abandon[ed] a clear guideline . . . in favor of no guidelines at
all.)3 8
Justice Cotter's primary argument related to the warrant ap-
plication's "sparse and unreliable information" linking Barnaby to
the methamphetamine production in his home.39 By abandoning
Reesman's guidelines, Justice Cotter argued that the Court al-
lowed for "uncertainty and randomness" in police officers' evalua-
tions of "the sufficiency of their evidence to justify the issuance of
a warrant."40
D. Justice Nelson's Dissent
Justice Nelson "respectfully, but vigorously, dissent[ed]" to
the majority's probable cause analysis. 41 Justice Nelson's strong-
32. Id. at 818.
33. Id. (citing Ill. v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232 (1983)).
34. Barnaby, 142 P.3d at 822.
35. Id. at 819. The Court recognized that "Sheridan's mere presence at the house does
not amount to sufficient probable cause to search Barnaby's residence"; it is but one piece of
the puzzle. Id. at 817.
36. Id. at 819.
37. Id. at 821 (Cotter, J., dissenting). Because Justice Cotter would have reversed the
district court as to this issue, she did not reach other issues addressed by the majority. Id.
38. Id. at 823.
39. Id. at 822.
40. Barnaby, 142 P.3d at 823.
41. Id. at 823 (Nelson, J., dissenting).
Vol. 68238
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est argument was the warrant application's lack of foundational
facts demonstrating its reliability and basis.42 He agreed with
Justice Cotter that the Court's decision was "an astonishing (and,
notably, unsolicited) sea change in the law of search and seizure in
Montana."43
Justice Nelson discussed the background law of probable
cause. 44 In summary, Justice Nelson pointed out that the Mon-
tana Supreme Court has defined probable cause as "the point at
which the individual's interest in privacy must yield to the govern-
mental interest in investigating criminal behavior by searching
for incriminating items."45 Although probable cause has been con-
sidered a fluid concept, a reasonable ground for belief of guilt is
still required.46 Justice Nelson also noted that, "[i]mportantly, the
determination of probable cause in this context is to be made by a
'neutral and detached judicial officer.' "-47 Without this check on
"zealous officers," people's homes become subject to search on the
whim of police officers. 48
Following his discussion of probable cause, Justice Nelson an-
alyzed the totality of the circumstances test.49 Justice Nelson spe-
cifically discussed how veracity, reliability, basis of knowledge,
and independent corroboration work within the totality of the cir-
cumstances test.50 The first three factors "are all highly relevant
in determining the value" of the application. 5 1 A magistrate is to
view all the signs of reliability, and cannot find probable cause
based on affidavits that are "purely conclusory." 52 Justice Nelson
noted that "it is not the number of statements, tips or events that
is determinative.... it is the probative force of one, some or all of
them."53
This is precisely where the majority went wrong, according to
Justice Nelson. A judge cannot assess the reliability of a tip with-
out facts on which to base the credibility of the tip.5 4 Justice Nel-
42. Id. at 824, 829, 831.
43. Id. at 824; see id. at 823 (Cotter, J., dissenting).
44. Id. at 826-27 (Nelson, J., dissenting).
45. Id. at 826 (quoting State v. Sundberg, 765 P.2d 736, 739 (Mont. 1988)).
46. Barnaby, 142 P.3d at 826.
47. Id. at 827 (quoting Ill. v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 240 (1983)).
48. Id.
49. Id. at 827-29.
50. Id. at 829-31.
51. Id. at 829 (quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 230).
52. Barnaby, 142 P.3d at 831.
53. Id. (quoting State v. Valley, 830 P.2d 1255, 1258 (Mont. 1992)).
54. Id.
5
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son observed that the officer who authored the warrant applica-
tion provided none of the "underlying circumstances from which
the informant(s) reached the conclusion that Sheridan was operat-
ing a meth lab at Barnaby's residence." 55 How and where did
these informants get their information? Were they nosy neighbors
or utility employees? 56 Justice Nelson stated that tips are not
suddenly credible just because "we can dream up reasonable sce-
narios" for an informant's basis of knowledge. 57
Justice Nelson carefully examined each assertion contained in
the warrant application to determine whether there was indeed
probable cause to search Barnaby's home for evidence of manufac-
turing methamphetamine. According to Justice Nelson, probable
cause would not have existed in this case. Justice Nelson vigor-
ously dissented from the majority, perhaps to prevent the courts
from "becom[ing] foot soldiers in the war on drugs at the expense
of their independent role as guardians of the Constitution."5 8
E. Conclusion
The interplay that took place among the Justices in the Rees-
man decision becomes further muddled in Barnaby. In Reesman,
Justice Nelson wrote the majority opinion, and specially con-
curred in response to Justice Regnier's concurring opinion and
Chief Justice Turnage's dissent. 59 Justice Regnier argued that po-
lice corroboration, although "a reliable method," was not the only
means possible to corroborate information. 60 He stated, "I fear
this requirement diverts the judicial officer's attention from the
more important question . . . whether [the detective] presented
sufficient information for the judge to accredit the confidential in-
formant's report."6 1 Likewise, Chief Justice Turnage dissented
from the majority opinion's conclusion that "corroboration for a
search warrant can only be sufficient if it is the result of police
investigation."62
The argument whether police corroboration is the only suffi-
cient means of corroboration began in Reesman and was seem-
55. Id. at 840.
56. Id. at 840-41.
57. Id. at 841.
58. Barnaby, 142 P.3d at 849.
59. State v. Reesman, 10 P.3d 83, 93-99 (Mont. 2000) (Regnier, J., concurring).
60. Id. at 94. See also Barnaby, 142 P.3d at 819.
61. Reesman, 10 P.3d at 94 (Regnier, J., concurring).
62. Id. at 99 (Turnage, C.J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
240 Vol. 68
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ingly resolved in Barnaby.6 3 Justice Regnier's concurring argu-
ment and Chief Justice Turnage's dissenting argument in Rees-
man became the majority opinion in Barnaby.64
Did Barnaby "abandon a clear guideline ... in favor of no
guidelines at all"6 5 and affect "an astonishing... sea change in
the law of search and seizure in Montana"?66 Or did Barnaby
"simply overrule an unduly restrictive rule"?6 7 Only time will tell
whether the Barnaby majority's more flexible solution to Rees-
man's corroboration limitation will prove to fit better with the
flexibility of the totality of the circumstances test used in assess-
ing probable cause in warrant applications. After Barnaby, police
officers' search warrant applications must still satisfy the totality
of the circumstances test regarding probable cause, but police cor-
roboration is no longer the only means available to provide a basis
of reliability in informants' information.
-Rennie L. Stichman
II. STATE v. McGowAN68
State v. McGowan addressed the narrow issue of whether a
breath alcohol concentration test administered fifty minutes after
the defendant's vehicle was stopped is sufficient evidence to sup-
port a jury conviction for DUI Per Se.6 9
The defendant, Dennis McGowan, was pulled over by Officer
Gary Herbst on October 20, 2003, at approximately 11:50 p.m. for
speeding.70 While speaking with McGowan, Herbst noticed an al-
cohol odor coming from McGowan's vehicle. 71 Herbst observed
McGowan moving slowly, speaking deliberately and slurring his
words slightly.72 Based on his observations, Herbst decided to
conduct a DUI investigation.73
63. See id. at 93-99; Barnaby, 142 P.3d at 818.
64. Barnaby, 142 P.3d at 818.
65. Id. at 823 (Cotter, J., dissenting).
66. Id. at 824 (Nelson, J., dissenting).
67. Id. at 819.
68. State v. McGowan, 139 P.3d 842 (Mont. 2006).
69. Id. at 843; Mont. Code Ann. § 61-8-406 (2005) (defining DUI Per Se as driving a
vehicle with an alcohol concentration in excess of 0.08).
70. McGowan, 139 P.3d at 842.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
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When Herbst first asked McGowan if he had consumed alco-
hol that evening, McGowan admitted to drinking approximately
five beers.74 Herbst then administered two physical field sobriety
tests, both of which McGowan failed.75 After a portable breath
test indicated the presence of alcohol in McGowan's system,
Herbst arrested McGowan for driving under the influence of alco-
hol. 76
Herbst transported McGowan to the detention center and
read him Montana's implied consent law, which provides, "a per-
son who operates or is in actual physical control of a vehicle upon
the ways of the state open to the public effectively consents to a
test of their blood or breath for the purpose of determining any
measured amount or detected presence of alcohol in their body."77
If an officer has particularized suspicion that a person operating a
motor vehicle is intoxicated, the officer may administer a prelimi-
nary screening test to estimate the alcohol concentration. 78 If a
person is subsequently arrested for DUI, the officer must then ad-
minister another blood or breath test at an approved location to
determine the amount of alcohol present in the person's system,
pursuant to Montana Code Annotated § 61-8-402(2)(a)(i). 79
At the detention center, McGowan consented to a breath test
on an Intoxilyzer 5000 breathalyzer.80 Herbst followed the re-
quired procedure, observing McGowan for the mandatory fifteen
minute deprivation period, and administering the test at approxi-
mately 12:40 a.m.8 l At this time, about fifty minutes after Mc-
Gowan's stop, the Intoxilyzer 5000 indicated that McGowan's
blood alcohol concentration was 0.092.82
The State charged McGowan with DUI in violation of Mon-
tana Code Annotated § 61-8-401, with DUI Per Se, in violation of
Montana Code Annotated § 61-8-406, and with speeding.8 3 The
Helena City Court judge convicted McGowan of speeding and DUI
Per Se in a bench trial on November 18, 2004.84 Upon his convic-
74. McGowan, 139 P.3d at 842-43.
75. Id. at 842-43.
76. Id. at 843; Mont. Code Ann. § 61-8-401 (2005).
77. Id. at 843-44 (citing Mont. Code Ann. § 61-8-402).
78. Id. at 844.
79. Id.; Mont. Code Ann. § 61-8-402(2)(a)(i).
80. McGowan, 139 P.3d at 843.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.; Mont. Code Ann. §§ 61-8-401, -406.
84. McGowan, 139 P.3d at 843.
242 Vol. 68
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tion, McGowan appealed for a new trial in district court, where a
jury trial was held on March 14, 2005.85 At the close of the State's
case, McGowan moved for judgment of acquittal, arguing that the
State did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that his blood alco-
hol concentration was 0.08 or more at the time he was driving.86
The district court denied the motion and the jury found McGowan
guilty of DUI Per Se.8 7
McGowan's primary argument on appeal to the Court was
that the Intoxilyzer 5000 did not prove his blood alcohol concen-
tration while he was in actual control of his vehicle.8 According
to Montana's DUI Per Se statute, it is "unlawful... for any person
to drive or be in actual physical control of ... a noncommercial
vehicle upon the ways of this state open to the public while the
person's alcohol concentration, as shown by analysis of the per-
son's blood, breath, or urine, is 0.08 or more . *s"89 McGowan
further argued that, because the DUI Per Se statute omits lan-
guage to indicate that the analysis is "taken within a reasonable
time after the alleged act," law enforcement must determine a per-
son's alcohol concentration at the time he or she was actually driv-
ing, not-as in McGowan's case-fifty minutes after driving.90
McGowan argued that, since the test was taken fifty minutes
after he was pulled over, the results were an inaccurate measure
of his blood alcohol level when he was driving.9 1 He emphasized
that a person's alcohol concentration rises for an unknown period
of time after the consumption of alcohol ends, making it reasona-
ble that his alcohol concentration was higher fifty minutes after
being stopped.92 The State contended that it presented sufficient
evidence for a jury to find that McGowan's blood alcohol concen-
tration was in excess of 0.08 at the time of his stop.93
Writing on behalf of the Court, Justice Morris noted that it is
not possible for police to administer a test while a suspect is actu-
ally driving.94 Thus, a reasonable interpretation of the DUI Per
Se statute allows admission of breath tests administered within a
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.; Mont. Code Ann. § 61-8-406.
88. McGowan, 139 P.3d at 843.
89. Mont. Code Ann. § 61-8-406(1)(a).
90. McGowan, 139 P.3d at 843.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 844.
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reasonable amount of time after a suspect has been driving.95
Justice Morris held that this interpretation reflected the Montana
Legislature's intent in enacting the statute. 96
In support of this interpretation of the statute, the Montana
Supreme Court cited decisional law from other jurisdictions. 97 It
found similar reasoning in a number of jurisdictions that "recog-
nize the impossible burden that requiring retrograde extrapola-
tion evidence would place on the [S]tate."98 "Retrograde extrapo-
lation" is the technique used by some experts "[to] estimate alco-
hol concentration at some earlier time based on the test results at
some later time."99 Based on the results of the Intoxilyzer 5000's
determination of McGowan's blood alcohol concentration, the
Court held that the State presented the jury with sufficient evi-
dence to find that McGowan committed the offense of DUI Per
Se.10 0
Justice Nelson dissented,101 arguing that language from the
DUI statute was incorrectly read into the DUI Per Se statute. 0 2
He argued that clear and unambiguous language in the DUI Per
Se statute indicated the Legislature intended that the measure-
ment of a person's alcohol concentration should correlate to when
the person was driving. 10 3
Justice Nelson contended that the use of retrograde extrapo-
lation would not unduly burden the State. 04 He was not per-
suaded by the results of the test taken fifty minutes after Mc-
Gowan was driving, and concluded that the lack of evidence,
viewed in conjunction with the language of the DUI Per Se stat-
ute, was insufficient to support the verdict, warranting rever-
sal.105 In closing, Justice Nelson urged the majority to "[i]nterpret
95. Id. at 844-45.
96. McGowan, 139 P.3d at 844 (citing Wild v. Fregein Constr., 68 P.3d 855 (Mont.
2003)) ("We presume the legislature would not pass meaningless legislation and we seek to
harmonize statutes ... so as to give effect to each.").
97. Id. at 845-46. The Court reviewed cases from Pennsylvania, Texas, and New
Hampshire.
98. Id. at 846.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 845.
101. Id. at 846 (Nelson, J., dissenting).
102. McGowan, 139 P.3d at 846-47 (Nelson, J., dissenting).
103. Id. at 847.
104. Id.
105. Id.
Vol. 68244
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the statute as it is written and let the branch of government that
wrote the legislation rewrite and fix the offending language."1 6
Justice Nelson's dissent eloquently illustrates the need to
make both Montana's DUI and DUI Per Se statutes more clear
and consistent. If the Montana Legislature further clarifies what
constitutes a "reasonable amount of time," fewer defendants will
base appeals on this issue, and detainee and defendant rights may
be better protected. But the Montana Supreme Court had little
legislative guidance when it held that conducting a breath test
fifty minutes after the initial detention time was reasonable. Un-
til the Montana Legislature clarifies Montana Code Annotated
§ 61-8-406, Montana practitioners should be aware that, under
current law, a "reasonable amount of time" could be a relatively
long time.
-Jennifer A. Giuttari
III. IN RE ESTATE OF BOVEY1 0 7
In Bovey, the Montana Supreme Court considered a chapter of
Montana's version of the Uniform Probate Code (Code) for the first
time. In deciding the case, the Court interpreted a section of the
Code providing guidance for when an adopted child is part of a
class for purposes of intestate succession.108 The Code stipulates
that "an adopted individual is not considered the child of the
adopting parent [for purposes of intestate succession] unless the
adopted individual lived while a minor, either before or after the
adoption, as a regular member of the household of the adopting
parent."10 9
The appellant, Lisa Bovey, claimed that as an adopted daugh-
ter of a trust's beneficiary, she was entitled to the trust's resi-
due.110 The creator of the trust at issue, Sue Bovey, executed a
will in 1984, creating the trust for her son, Ford Bovey.11 Sue
died in October 1988.112 The residuary clause of the trust read:
Upon the death of my son, Ford, this trust shall terminate and
all of the then remaining accrued and unpaid income and all of the
106. Id. at 849.
107. In re Est. of Bovey, 132 P.3d 510 (Mont. 2006).
108. Mont. Code Ann. § 72-2-715 (2005).
109. Id.
110. Bovey, 132 P.3d at 513.
111. Id. at 512.
112. Id.
2007 245
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then remaining principal of this trust shall be distributed, outright,
and free of trust, in equal shares, to my then living heirs-at-law. 113
Ford and Lisa met in 1979 when Lisa's mother, Sharon Mc-
Gregor, began dating Ford. 114 Sharon, along with Lisa and Lisa's
brother, moved into Ford's house in 1982 when Lisa was thirteen
years old. 115 Ford supported Lisa financially while she lived in his
home." 6 Lisa's mother was often away from home, as she worked
full-time for one of Ford's businesses."17 While Lisa was living at
Ford's home, he introduced her as his daughter to others and men-
tioned adopting her."18 There was no other evidence of Ford's in-
tent to adopt Lisa until after Sue's death." ' 9
After Lisa lived in Ford's home for approximately two years,
the Montana Department of Family Services placed her in foster
care in December 1984, since Ford was drinking heavily at the
time and Lisa's mother worked and was rarely home.' 20 Lisa re-
turned to Ford's home for sixteen days in June 1985, before run-
ning away. 12' She was later returned to foster care.' 22 A July 9,
1985 placement order "found that continuing to reside in Ford's
home would be detrimental to Lisa's welfare, and that she was not
under the care and supervision of a suitable adult and had no
proper guidance to provide for her physical, moral and emotional
well-being."' 23
Ford and Sharon married in July 1986, after Lisa turned
eighteen and graduated from high school.' 24 Ford adopted Lisa in
1993.125 Sharon and Ford divorced in 1997.126
Ford asked Lisa to help him in his recovery from open-heart
surgery and spoke to an adoption attorney about his affection for
Lisa.' 27 However, since Sue's death in 1988, Ford had repeatedly
expressed to his trust officer his intentions to adopt someone for
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Bovey, 132 P.3d at 512.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 513.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 512.
121. Id.
122. Bovey, 132 P.3d at 512-13.
123. Id. at 513.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
246 Vol. 68
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the purpose of exercising control over the residue of the trust.128
He mentioned several people, including Lisa, in this context, and
later told a family friend he had adopted Lisa to prevent his rela-
tives from getting the residue of Sue's trust after Ford's death.129
The trial court held that Lisa was not entitled to the trust's
residue, 30 interpreting the statute to mean that Sue's intent was
relevant in determining whether Lisa was a regular member of
Ford's household.' 3 ' The following language from the official com-
ment led to the trial court's holding that Sue's intent was rele-
vant:
The general theory of subsection (c) [§ 72-2-715(3)] is that a trans-
feror who is not the adopting parent of an adopted child would want
the child to be included in a class gift as a child of the adopting
parent only if the child lived while a minor, either before or after the
adoption, as a regular member of the household of that adopting
parent.132
On appeal, the Montana Supreme Court held that the trial
court's interpretation was incorrect. According to the Court, Sue's
intent was determined by the law of intestate succession: "Where
it is determined that the child was a regular member of the house-
hold of the adopting parent, the legislature has declared that the
testator intended for that child to be included in a class gift for
children of the adopting parent." 33 Rather than analyze Sue's in-
tent, the Court's "only function is to determine the factual issue of
whether Lisa, while a minor, was a regular member of Ford's
household."'3 4 The Court then set out to analyze whether Lisa
had met this qualification.
The Court considered the section of the California Probate
Code that Montana Code Annotated § 72-2-715(3) was modeled af-
ter. 35 The commission comment to section 21115 of the Califor-
nia Probate Code "precludes the adoption of a person (often an
adult) solely for the purpose of permitting the adoptee to take
under the testamentary instrument of another."' 36
In Estate of DeLoreto, the California Court of Appeals held
that the statute should be strictly construed so as to "discourage
128. Bovey, 132 P.3d at 513.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 514.
132. Mont. Code Ann. § 72-2-715 off. cmt. (2006).
133. Bovey, 132 P.3d at 516.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 514.
136. Cal. Prob. Code Ann. § 21115 off. cmt. (West 2007).
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adoptions made for the purpose of becoming beneficiaries of the
estates of unsuspecting testators."1 37 The policy was first dis-
cussed in Estate of Pittman, where the same court held that chil-
dren who are adopted as adults should generally be excluded from
class designations, but should be included in the class when they
had been taken into the adoptive parent's home as a minor and
reared by the adoptive parent. 138 The Pittman court reasoned
that "[a]dult adoptees coming within the exception should there-
fore be deemed to come within the class unless it is shown that the
purpose of the adoption was to diminish or defeat the income and
remainder interests of other beneficiaries 'for purposes of financial
gain or as a spite device.' "139
After considering official comments to both the Montana and
California statute and relevant California case law, the Montana
Supreme Court concluded that the statute's language-"regular
member of the household of the adopting parent"140-indicates
the legislature's intent to require "more than simple residence for
a time at the adopting parent's home."141 Courts must examine
the relationship between the parties and conclude the relationship
was "that of a household, a familial relationship," in order to sat-
isfy the statute.142 Further, the underlying policy of the statute
(to discourage trust beneficiaries from adopting children for the
sole purpose of defeating the remainder interests of other benefi-
ciaries) requires that courts consider evidence of such conduct
when determining whether the statute was satisfied. 143
In holding that Lisa, while a minor, was not a regular mem-
ber of Ford's household, the Court relied on evidence surrounding
Lisa's stay at Ford's house. The Court found that any relationship
that existed between Lisa and Ford was "outweighed by the lack
of any familial relationship between the two while Lisa was a mi-
nor, and because Ford's true intent in the adoption [was] to cir-
cumvent Sue's will."1 44
In a dissent joined by Chief Justice Gray, Justice Rice criti-
cized the majority for over-playing the policy background and ig-
137. Est. of DeLoreto, 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d 513, 517 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. 2004).
138. Est. of Pittman, 163 Cal. Rptr. 527, 531 (Cal. App. 4th Dist. 1980).
139. Id. (citing Edward C. Halbach, The Rights of Adopted Children under Class Gifts,
50 Iowa L. Rev. 971, 988 (1965)).
140. Mont. Code Ann. § 72-2-715(3) (2005).
141. Bovey, 132 P.3d at 515.
142. Id. at 515 n. 4.
143. Id. at 516.
144. Id.
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noring the facts, stating, "[tihe Court attempts to stretch the pol-
icy considerations which drove the enactment of the general rule
into a directive to interpret narrowly the rule's already narrow ex-
ception." 145 The dissent also disagreed with the majority's charac-
terization of California case law. The dissent reasoned that the
policy set forth in Pittman was "for the purpose of adopting the
rule itself, not to guide an assessment of the relationship between
the adopting parent and the child."1 46 In fact, the Pittman court
decided that adult adoptees were excluded from the class because
no evidence was introduced to show the adoptees had ever lived
with the adopting parent as minors. 147
The dissent distinguished DeLoreto, stating that reliance on
policy statements made in DeLoreto was
misleading for two reasons: (1) DeLoreto used 'strict application' to
reject expansion of the statute to adopted adults who had never re-
sided with the adopting parent (not the issue here); and (2) the
'strict application' rule was not used by DeLoreto to require a nar-
row interpretation of the exception allowing adopted children to
demonstrate their membership of the household as minors (the is-
sue here). 148
The dissent interpreted the statute to require a more objec-
tive review of the facts surrounding the adoptor and adoptee's re-
lationship, because "the statute does not require that [the
adoptee] prove that she and [the adoptori had established a rela-
tionship in the nature of a child-parent relationship." 49 In deter-
mining that Lisa was a regular member of Ford's household, the
dissent focused on the four years Ford and Lisa were acquainted
during her teens, that she lived in Ford's home for two of those
years, and Ford's monetary support of Lisa for over two years. 150
The majority's approach to this case of first impression will
lead to inconsistent results. Its interpretation of the language
"regular member of the household of the adopting parent," re-
quires courts to engage in a subjective analysis of a case's facts to
determine whether the adopting parent and the adoptee, while a
minor, had a "familial relationship." 151 The dissent's approach
provides for a more uniform, objective analysis of the circum-
145. Id. at 517 (Rice, J. & Gray, C.J., dissenting).
146. Id.
147. Bovey, 132 P.3d at 517 (Rice, J. & Gray, C.J., dissenting) (citing Est. of Pittman, 163
Cal. Rptr. 527, 531 (Cal. App. 1980)).
148. Id. (Rice, J. & Gray, C.J., dissenting).
149. Id. at 520.
150. Id. at 518-19.
151. Id. at 515 (majority).
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stances surrounding the minor adoptee's living situation. The dis-
sent's approach is also more faithful to the rules of statutory inter-
pretation, which require examination of the statute's plain lan-
guage. The language in this statute does not require
demonstration of a parental relationship. The dissent's approach
allows for more uniform results and predictability for families who
find themselves in situations similar to the Bovey's situation.
-Ashley A. Griffith
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